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1 Introduction
During the past few decades, numerous
countries have adopted legislation that
established a minimum presence – or quota – for
women on party lists used for the election of
legislative bodies. However, in spite of the
adoption of these norms, the percentage of
women in the different decision-making bodies
remains relatively low, with only a few cases that
could be considered substantially successful.
Costa Rica is one of these cases.
Costa Rica is considered one of the most
consolidated democracies in Latin America and
has held free and fair democratic elections since
1953. It is a presidential democracy with one
legislative body, composed of 57 legislators. It is
the only country in the world that has used three
different types of quota legislation over a short
period of time (Jones 2004), making it a unique
political scenario to analyse the effectiveness of
those different types of legislation: voluntary
quota, quota without placement and quota with
mandatory placement, which increased the
descriptive representation1 of women in
parliament from 15 per cent in 1994 to 38.5 per
cent in 2006. In addition, Costa Rica is one of the
few countries in the world to have adopted
legislation establishing gender parity and
mandatory alternate placement, which will come
into effect in the 2014 national election.
This article sheds light on the political and social
processes – including the main actors – that
influenced the evolution of the different types of
quota legislation, culminating with the adoption
of the norms that established gender parity. It
also analyses the effectiveness of each type of
legislation to increase the descriptive
representation of women and ends with some
considerations in regards to the impact of
implementing a quota system on the advance of
a feminist agenda of social and gender justice.
2 Evolution of the quota legislation in Costa
Rica: the first steps
The first initiatives to embody some of the rules
in the national legislation for the establishment
of a minimum quota for women’s political
participation in Costa Rica emerged in 1988.
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After strong pressures from the women’s
movement, the First Lady at the time, Margarita
Penón,2 negotiated a Bill in the legislative
assembly for the enactment of a law for real
equality, with the aim of helping to transcend the
formal equality as it is defined in the
Constitution. Inspired by the Convention for the
Elimination of all forms of Discrimination
against Women (CEDAW), the Bill was written
by feminist lawyers and activists who had
dedicated themselves to work together with the
First Lady with the aim of presenting to
Congress a legal reform for promoting true
equality for women in different spheres,
including that of political representation.
The original Bill included various legal
provisions to establish a quota system. However,
the debate on the Bill provoked strong negative
reactions in the Legislative Assembly that
motivated their exclusion from the final text,
which was endorsed in 1990 under the name
‘Law for the Promotion of Social Equality of
Women’ (Law 7142).3 As can be derived from the
title with which the Bill was finally passed, the
original content, which intended to transcend
the concept of formal equality, was eliminated,
including the proposal to establish mandatory
quotas for the political representation of women.
Although explicit mention of the quotas was
eliminated from the Law, it included a chapter
on ‘Political Rights of Women’, which made a
reference to the obligation of the political parties
to incorporate in their by-laws mechanisms to
promote and assure the effective participation of
women in significant percentages (articles 5 and
6 of Chapter 11 of Law 7142). Although the
various political parties did implement some
reforms to their internal rules in 1992, the vague
phrasing of the Law ensured that there were no
concrete mechanisms established for the
implementation of quotas, making it an
essentially voluntary exercise. In short, in this
period, reforms were introduced with good
intentions and declarations of goodwill, but they
did not have any practical impact for women.
Given that the dispositions in the Law for the
Promotion of Social Equality of Women were not
being fulfilled, the Depute from the Partido
Liberación Nacional (National Liberation Party),
Gladys Rojas, presented a Bill to the Legislative
Assembly in 1992 aimed at reforming the
Electoral Code (the legal instrument that
regulates the national election processes), in
order to introduce a mandatory quota system for
women’s participation in political parties. On
this occasion, the Supreme Elections Tribunal
was against the proposal, claiming that the Bill
did not establish the necessary mechanisms to
ensure the fulfillment of the principle of
proportional representation nor the mechanisms
to sanction those who did not fulfill the
requirements. In other words, it was another
vague project that was sent to the archives.
However, these first initiatives generated
expectation and hope in female activists from
various political parties, which started to build
an important movement to reform the Electoral
Code in a clear and precise way with the aim of
establishing a quota system as a mandatory
mechanism for all political parties. On 28
November 1996, Article 60 of the Electoral Code
was reformed in such a manner that it obliged
political parties to include, in their internal
rules, the necessary mechanisms to ensure a 40
per cent participation of women in the party
structure, the electoral lists and in the
delegations to the different assemblies of the
parties (Bolaños 2006).
2.1 Formal equality vis-à-vis real equality
These reforms to the Electoral Code created the
basis for parity in the access of women to
positions of power and represented a significant
advance in legal norms for equity in political
participation. The national discussion around
these reforms also made evident the existent
myths around the political participation of
women and added to the public debate the voices
of women who aspired to positions of popular
representation, but who had not been able to get
them as a result of the perverted mechanisms of
patriarchal pacts and arrangements that operate
inside the party structures.
In spite of the important step that the approval
of these regulations meant, the 1998 elections
were a demonstration of the great distance that
exists between formal equality and real equality.
It also showed the diverse stratagems that
political parties can use when there is no real
will to guarantee gender equality. On this
occasion, the main problem came from the fact
that the regulation had not explicitly stated that
the 40 per cent representation of women should
Sagot Democratic Representation, Affirmative Action and Quotas in Costa Rica26
be for electable positions. The norm also failed
to state that the registration of parties that did
not comply would not be accepted.
As a result of a request made by the Instituto
Nacional de las Mujeres (National Institute for
Women – the national machinery for the
advancement of women) the Electoral Tribunal
had to inform political parties that it was not
going to accept the registration of any lists that
did not fulfill the requirement of a minimum 40
per cent of women. This is when the big charade
began. On the lists that did fulfill the
requirement, all women were placed last, in
positions without any possibility of being elected.
The registration of lists that did not fulfill the
quota was accepted because the parties claimed
they had not found enough women who wanted
to participate. Some parties used the trick of
adding together all the women on a national
scale, without considering the lists separated for
each municipality or region. On some lists, not
one single woman was registered. In fact, out of
the 23 parties that presented candidates for the
Legislative Assembly in the 1998 elections, 15
did not fulfill the quota (Torres 2001). It seemed
evident then that parties may have included
women on the journey but they did not want
them there at arrival.
Thus, the Costa Rican experience shows that if
the quota legislation is not explicit and strict,
the traditional masculine power culture within
political parties will find loopholes to avoid
giving women equal opportunities to occupy
elected positions. Women, in general, lack the
experience to negotiate their presence and
depend on the goodwill of male party leaders,
who will not give up their privileged positions
unless they are forced by explicit legislation.
Therefore, although the 1998 election
represented a significant advance for women
since they increased their representation to 19
per cent in Congress and 30 per cent in
municipal government (compared with 15 and 12
per cent, respectively in the previous election),
there was clear evidence of resistance to the
quota legislation, and the necessity of explicit
and mandatory rules was apparent.
The analysis of the practical application of the
quota legislation in the national elections of 1998
allowed for the construction of well-grounded
arguments to appeal to the Supreme Elections
Tribunal for a revision of those norms. After
some heavy lobbying by women’s organisations,
the appeal for revision was presented by Gloria
Valerín, Minister for Women’s Affairs and
supported by Olga Nidia Fallas, an influential
judge with the Elections Tribunal. As a result, in
Resolution No. 1863, 23 September 1999, the
Elections Tribunal, interpreted the very ‘spirit’ of
the 1996 reform to the Electoral Code, stating
that:
? The quota of 40 per cent of women in the
electoral lists must be in positions with a
possibility of being elected.
? The quota of 40 per cent must be respected in
each district, municipality and province
assembly and not seen as an overall ‘global’
quota.
? Each party is obliged to incorporate the
necessary adjustments in their by-laws in
order to guarantee the effective participation
of women in the given form and percentage.
? The Civil Registry will not register candidate
lists that do not adjust to these parameters.
? The Civil Registry will not accredit reforms of
by-laws or the acts of the assemblies that do
not fulfill the established requirements.
The 1999 ruling surprised many politicians who
had grudgingly supported the original law in
1996, which they thought would be relatively
ineffective due to the decision not to include a
placement mandate (Jones 2004). Thus, in
another resolution (No. 2837) from 12 December
1999, as a result of a consultation made by
various political parties who were trying to find a
way of getting around the requirements for the
quota, claiming that they had not properly
understood the concept of ‘electable position’,
the Elections Tribunal clarifies the following:
By ‘electable position’ it should be understood
that which gives a person real possibility of
being elected and hence should be considered
individually in the confirmation of lists per
province. The political parties are obliged to
implement the quota system for women and
should consider the percentage of 40 per cent
to be a minimum that as such could increase
but not decrease.
The political party is obliged to promote a
culture of democracy and participation that
will make possible the incorporation of women.
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Once the rules, proceedings and sanctions were
completely clear, one could begin to see the
effects of the quota system. In the 2002 elections,
women’s representation in the Legislative
Assembly reached 35 per cent (see Figure 2),
giving the Costa Rican Congress the highest
female representation in any Latin American
political body at that time. In the municipalities,
the percentage increased to 47 per cent (see
Figure 1), almost reaching parity (Bolaños 2006).
During the last two elections of 2006 and 2010,
the participation of women in the Legislative
Assembly increased to 38.5 per cent, while the
municipalities maintained figures close to 50 per
cent.
The importance of using a quota system is
reflected not only in the significant increase on
the descriptive participation of women in
Congress and local government, but also when,
by contrast, one analyses the spaces and posts
where the legal mandate of the quota is not
imposed. In these posts, such as the ministries,
the Supreme Court of Justice, the autonomous
institutions, the Foreign Service and the Mayors,
women continue to be a minority. For instance,
women only represent 11 per cent of the
country’s Mayors, 30 per cent of the Supreme
Court Justices and, during the second presidency
of Oscar Arias (2006–2010), only five women
were appointed Ministers, out of a cabinet of 21
members.
2.2 Moving forward and backwards
The Costa Rican experience can be used to show
the permanent tension between the proposals
and visions of any progressive movement and its
influence on the public agenda. In other words,
as the women’s movement’s proposals earn social
recognition, they risk losing their profoundly
transforming nature. Thus, the institutions
begin to appropriate women’s demands for
equality and parity, but to adapt them to their
logic and interests, even becoming counteractive.
As an example of how the mechanisms created
by the feminist movement can become
Sagot Democratic Representation, Affirmative Action and Quotas in Costa Rica28
Figure 1 Costa Rica: female representation in municipal governments, 1953–2006 (absolute numbers)
Source System of gender Indicators (SIEG) – INAMU (Instituto Nacional de las Mujeres; National Institute for Women).
Figure 2 Costa Rica: female representation in the legislative assembly, 1982–2010 (%)
Source System of gender Indicators (SIEG) – INAMU.
counteractive, it is worth mentioning the case of
the Partido Nueva Liga Feminista (New Feminist
League Party), which participated in the 2006
elections. When this party, which intended to
bring candidates and an openly feminist agenda
to Congress, presented their registration, it was
refused by the Civil Registry who claimed that
they had not fulfilled the quota for men, i.e.
40 per cent. Finally, after a long struggle, the
Supreme Elections Tribunal took an important
decision which helped to clarify not only the
legitimacy of the Nueva Liga Feminista and their
entitlement to register as a political party – in
spite of not having ‘enough’ men nominated –
but also the quota system for women, creating
jurisprudence which clarified the mechanisms
even further and deepened its justification as a
compensatory measure. On this occasion, the
Elections Tribunal declared (Resolution No.
2096-E-2005, 31 August 2005):
The 40 per cent participation provided as an
electoral rule is a minimum and not a
maximum … The policy development of the
quota for women’s participation… is the
recognition of the legislator that, in spite of
the principle of equality being guaranteed in
the Political Constitution and in the diverse
instruments for Human Rights ratified by the
country, there is historically an inequality
between men and women in the electoral
sphere which should be remedied with positive
discrimination, to avoid this discrimination.
The special protection that the Electoral Code
gives to women … cannot be understood for
men also, as this would be admitting that they
have been equally discriminated, when truth is
that in political elections, men have an
advantageous position in relation to women…
In spite of the important clarifications made by
the Elections Tribunal, the tensions between the
progressive proposals of the women’s movement
and its concrete results are permanent. In that
sense, rather than bringing about social and
cultural transformations, the processes of
institutionalisation of feminist claims often end
up producing co-optation of those claims and of
the movement itself. In the case of Costa Rica, as
will be discussed later in this article, the passing
of the quota legislation has also meant the arrival
into power of many conservative women, closely
connected to political and economic elites, who do
not have any progressive agendas and who, in fact,
act as strong opponents of the feminist
movement, particularly on those issues related to
sexual and reproductive rights. Therefore, the
quota system can be seen as a major achievement,
but also as an example of how the women’s
movement’s transforming approaches are then
‘recycled’ by the State and returned to society as
sociably acceptable laws and policies that do not
represent a real threat to the establishment.
2.3 Achieving parity
The discussions around the need for a new
Electoral Code that started at the end of the
1990s, served as an opportunity for the women’s
movement to envision the possibility of including
the concept of parity in the new Code. In addition,
the creation of a new political party in 2000, the
Partido Acción Ciudadana (Citizen’s Action
Party), which voluntarily incorporated into its
internal regulations the notions of parity and
alternability by sex (woman-man, man-woman in
such a way that two people of the same sex cannot
be listed consecutively in the same list) in the
electoral lists, opened up expectations in women
members of other parties and also reinforced the
idea that this was not an impossible goal after all.
Hence, as a result of actions undertaken by the
Ministry for Women’s Affairs, some feminist
organisations, legislators from different political
parties4 and the Supreme Elections Tribunal
itself, since 2001, an important step in
guaranteeing women’s equal representation was
achieved in 2009, with the final endorsement of
the new Electoral Code, which will be activated
in the 2014 national elections. Thus, after a
decade of heated debates and negotiations – and
strong opposition by some parties5 – in this new
Electoral Code, approved in September 2009
(Law No. 8765), the political participation of
men and women is defined as a human right
under the protection of the principles of equality
and non-discrimination, establishing parity and
alternability by sex as an obligation.
The second article of the new Electoral code
stipulates, on the issues of parity and alternation
by sex, that:
Participation is governed by the principle of
parity which implies that all delegations,
electoral lists and other bodies with even
numbers should be composed of 50 per cent of
women and 50 per cent of men, and that in
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delegations, payrolls and bodies with odd
number of members the total difference
between men and women cannot be more
than one.
All the electoral lists will use the mechanism
of alternation of sex (woman–man and
man–woman) in such a way that two people of
the same sex cannot be listed consecutively on
the list.
The new Electoral Code also established clearly
that the bylaws of the political parties should
contain regulations and mechanisms that assure
the principles of equality, gender equity, non-
discrimination and parity, as much in the party
structure as in the electoral lists. Also, sanctions
were included for parties that do not fulfill these
principles, including the refusal or cancellation
of their registration and the prohibition of
participation in electoral processes.
Finally, the state contribution was authorised
within a series of constitutional arrangements,
for the political parties to develop capacity
building for men and women in a permanent
way, with the aim of creating and promoting
knowledge on human rights and gender equality;
encouraging leadership, political participation
and empowerment; and nomination for and
holding of positions with decision-making power;
among others.
With these reforms to the Electoral Code, it is
evident that Costa Rica has become one of the
first countries in Latin America to establish
gender parity as an obligatory legal norm in
political representation. It is evident that for the
2014 elections this implies an important change
to the face of politics. Nevertheless, after almost
a decade of progressive application of a quota
system, the mechanism also starts to show some
of its limitations in reaching its fundamental
goals, for example the real redistribution of
power between genders, a substantive
representation of women and the construction of
a more just and egalitarian society.
3 Some lessons to be drawn from the Costa
Rican experience
The first lesson learnt about the application of
the quota legislation in Costa Rica is that this
system only functions if clear norms and
procedures are established, which includes
sanctions for those who do not fulfil the
requirements. Also, extremely significant is the
existence of a strong and persistent women’s
movement, pushing reforms and keeping an eye
on their fulfilment (Jones 2004). In this way, the
effectiveness of the quota system to guarantee,
at least, the descriptive representation of women
is dependent on five factors:
1 That it is part of the national electoral
legislation;
2 That there exists a women’s movement with
the capacity to monitor compliance with the
regulations;
3 That there is clarity in terms of the
mechanisms for implementation;
4 That it is obligatory to apply the
corresponding quota for women in eligible
positions;
5 That the electoral body is directly involved in
guaranteeing the fulfilment of the system and
that there are clearly defined sanctions,
consistently applied when requirements are
not fulfilled.
While having women’s greater participation in
decision-making spaces has a fundamental
impact on electoral politics, the quota system
does not necessarily influence the more central
and substantive aspects of a real political
transformation towards gender justice. It may
change the face of politics, which is an important
achievement and a modification in the
traditional political culture, but it does not
necessarily allow the advancement of a feminist
agenda of social transformation.
In the case of Costa Rica, it is interesting to note
that the development of legislation to extend the
rights of women reached a peak in the country
between 1994 and 2000. During this period, the
highest number of laws and reforms in this
matter were endorsed and promoted, in
particular, the Convention of Belem do Pará and
a large quantity of legislation and public policies
on sexual harassment, domestic violence,
alimony, civil union, commercial sexual
exploitation, sexual rights and reproductive
rights. Curiously, the legislation on quotas was
not in force at that time, and hence the
representation of women in Congress was
relatively low. In fact, these advances, including
the legislation on quotas, seem to connect more
to an expansion of the activities of the feminist
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movement at the national and international
levels during the 1990s and not so much to a
greater presence of women in electable positions.
On the contrary, from 2001, when the legislation
on quotas was already in force, as well as the
clarifications made by the Elections Tribunal, the
pace of endorsement of public policies and laws
related to equality and gender equity slowed
down notably. So, the significant increase in the
number of women in Congress does not seem to
have had a direct effect on gender and social
justice. Also, there are no significant differences
among women from the different parties. The
few women legislators who have brought about
an open agenda for gender justice since the
implementation of the quota system, seem to
respond more to their personal interests and
history, and to their previous relations with the
feminist movement, than to party lines.
In that sense, very few pieces of new legislation
for the advancement of women’s rights have been
approved since the implementation of the quota
system. According to reports by lobbyists from
the women’s movement, they tend to negotiate
the different law proposals with legislators on an
individual basis, not always taking their gender
into consideration, since that does not seem to be
a positive factor in all cases. For instance, during
the discussions on the Bill to Criminalise
Violence Against Women in 2007, the President
of the Congressional Women’s Commission,6 in
charge of analysing all law proposals related to
women’s issues, disagreed with the Bill, arguing
that, on many occasions, women provoke the
family violence and the important thing was not
to create more privileges for women, but to
preserve the sanctity of the family.7 Also, women
legislators from different parties were opposed to
a Bill that proposed an eight-hour work-day for
domestic workers, arguing that they could no
longer participate in politics if their domestic
workers did not work extended hours. As Rosita
Acosta, president of the Domestic Workers
Association, told these women legislators at a
public hearing, ‘what you want is a slave and not
a domestic worker’.8
In spite of the quota system, during the past
legislature (2006–10), with 38.5 per cent of
female representation, only one of the legislators,
Ana Helena Chacón, from the Partido Unidad
Social Cristiana (Social Christian Unity Party),
put forward an open programme for justice and
gender equity. This shows that the relationship
between increasing the presence of women in
Parliament and the endorsement of laws for the
advancement of equality and equity is neither
automatic nor direct. As Susan Francheschet
(2008) argues (citing Dodson 2006):
Whilst existing studies show that in general it
is more likely that female legislators give
priority to gender than their male colleagues,
their greater preoccupation with themes
related to women does not directly translate
into better legislative results for them.
(Franceschet 2008: 69)
From this perspective, although the existence of
the quota legislation increases the possibility of
women getting into electable positions, there is
no guarantee of whom these women will be, nor
what their political agenda is. In Costa Rica, the
main parties have chosen very disciplined women,
faithful to party lines, with close relationships,
almost subordinate, to important men in these
parties, and hence very unlikely to defy the status
quo. In fact, the three main traditional parties
from the right or centre-right (Liberación
Nacional, National Liberation; Unidad Social
Cristiana, Social Christian Unity and Movimiento
Libertario, Libertarian Movement), have
nominated women as Party Speakers at critical
political points, and it has been precisely these
women who have been in charge of bringing
forward the neoliberal agenda, including the
ratification of the Free Trade Agreement with the
USA, which had the people of Costa Rica in social
upheaval for almost two years.
As a result, as suggested by some critics, in
practice, the quota system and neoliberalism are
not mutually exclusive but more like partners in
the search for a new world order (Krook 2008).
In the context of a growing global neoliberalism,
it appears then that the quota system means an
important concession to the demands of the
women’s movement, but at the same time, it
becomes an empty promise in terms of
contributing to breaching the growing gap
between political empowerment on the one hand
and social and economic empowerment on the
other (Phillips 1999).
In Costa Rica, the women elected after the
approval of the quota system have been more
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willing to pass legislation intended to transform
the welfare character of the national state, than
legislation that extends social justice. For instance,
most women legislators voted in favour of Bills
that privatised the telecommunications and
insurance services (2008),9 landmark institutions
of the Costa Rican welfare state since 1948. In
addition, the majority of women legislators have
voted in favour of Bills related to intellectual
property (in 2008 and 2009), that grant privileges
to the transnational pharmaceutical companies,
compromising access for the poor to affordable
medicines.10 However, they have not been willing to
pass existing law proposals11 related to women’s
access to better health services, sexual and
reproductive rights, same sex civil unions, the
autonomy of indigenous people, which will secure
them rights over their lands, or the constitutional
reform to separate the Church from the State.12
This raises the question as to whether it is more
important to have, in a decision-making position,
a person that shares feminist principles or simply
a woman, independently of her political position,
ideology or ethics. In Costa Rica, the most clear
and convincing position on justice and gender
equality was held by José Merino, legislator from
Partido Frente Amplio (2006–10), a small leftist
party with a conscious discourse about social
inequalities and the necessity to confront them in
all their different dimensions, including gender.
The quota system thus guarantees women access
to positions of political representation, but does
not guarantee the quality of their actions nor the
type of decisions they are going to make. Hence,
quotas encourage the descriptive participation of
women, but not necessarily their substantive
participation. Because of this, many feminists
express doubts about quotas, arguing that,
among other things, these mechanisms help
push neoliberal agendas, demobilise women’s
movements, result in the election of conservative
women, promote a static vision of women as a
group and diminish their efficiency as political
actors (Krook 2008).
However, other feminists also argue that in a
truly democratic society, the participation of
women in positions of decision-making and power
should be understood as a right that cannot be
conditioned to their willingness to fight for
women’s issues. From this perspective, the quota
system represents an advance but has to go hand
in hand with other processes of empowerment
and social transformation that really question the
patriarchal order. But instead, they only produce
partial ruptures in the system, but nothing that
really changes the very foundations, which have
generated not only inequality but also a society
that is ethically unsustainable.
The Costa Rican experience shows that quota
legislation mandating a minimum percentage of
seats to be occupied by women, accompanied
with a placement in electable positions, had a
powerful effect on the number of women elected
in Congress. Another important lesson drawn
from Costa Rica is that the quota legislation
needs to be precise and strictly enforced. Norms
that rely merely on the will of political parties,
usually fall on deaf ears, exercising no significant
impact on the election of women. The role
played by a strong women’s movement that
advocates for quota legislation and is capable of
monitoring its implementation is significant.
After several years of constant effort, the
persistence of quota advocates paid off with the
landmark 1999 Elections Tribunal ruling and
with the introduction of the notions of parity and
alternability in the new Electoral Code.
Thus, the quota system, as applied in Costa Rica,
has proved to be a very effective instrument for
increasing the descriptive representation of
women. In fact, it provides a good case for quota
supporters in other countries that have adopted
ineffective quota legislation. However, as stated
before, while the quota system, as implemented
in Costa Rica, will ensure a significant presence
for women in legislative bodies, that system by
itself will not enhance the quality of democracy,
nor will it expand social justice or guarantee the
representation of feminist interests in the public
agenda.
Because of this, the objective of the feminist
movement is not and cannot be only to fight to
extend the representation of women in electable
positions or for an improvement in policies and
laws. The objective of the feminist movement
should be to continue with the struggle that was
initiated more than 200 years ago for the
construction of a just society that guarantees
autonomy to women and all other excluded
groups, as well as their wellbeing, integrity and
equal access to power and to the material and
symbolic resources of society.
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Notes
* The author wishes to thank Gloria Valerín,
former Minister of Women’s Affairs and
former legislator, for her generous assistance
in locating the entire Congressional file on
the discussions and passing of the new
Electoral Code.
1 Descriptive representation is here understood
as the presence of members of a specific social
group in a political entity (Franceschet 2008).
2 At the time, she was the wife of President
Oscar Arias, who supported the Bill, giving it
political viability.
3 Among the arguments put forward against the
project for real equality were: that the idea of
proportional gender representation was
unconstitutional; that the project was
unnecessary as discrimination no longer
existed against Costa Rican women; that
recognising the necessity of a reform of this
kind would be accepting that both the
Constitution and the laws were gender
discriminating, which was not true; that
equality cannot be imposed by force; and,
finally, that those promoting the project were
‘frustrated women’ (Badilla 1997).
4 Since 2002, legislators from different political
parties, including Emilia Rodríguez,
Margarita Penón and Rodrigo Alberto Carazo
(Partido Acción Ciudadana, Citizen Action
Party), Kyra de la Rosa (Partido Liberación
Nacional, National Liberation Party) and
Gloria Valerín, former Minister of Women’s
Affairs and now legislator (Partido Unidad
Social Cristiana, Social Christian Unity Party)
began presenting motions to include the
principles of parity and alternability by sex in
the new Electoral Code.
5 The main opposition to the incorporation of
the principles of parity and alternation in the
new Electoral Code came from the Partido
Movimiento Libertario (Libertarian
Movement Party), a right-wing party that had
been created in 1996.
6 Legislator Gilda González from the Partido
Liberación Nacional.
7 Information provided by Gabriela Arguedas,
former legislative aide.
8 Information provided by Rosita Acosta,
President of the Domestic Workers
Association.
9 With the exception of the women legislators
from Partido Acción Ciudadana, who voted
against those reforms, but were a minority.
10 Here again, all legislators from Partido Acción
Ciudadana voted against these Bills.
11 These law proposals have not been accepted
by women legislators from any party, with the
exception of Ana Helena Chacón, who is, in
fact, the proponent of many of the reforms.
12 Costa Rica is one of the few confessional
states in the world. The Constitution
stipulates that the official religion of the State
is Roman Catholicism.
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